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 Interfering with editorial judgement, making ‘good television’ and the loss 
of the public interest defence 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Steve Foster 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent decisions in Richard v BBC1 and Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd2 have highlighted 
the need for the media to employ professional broadcasting in order to protect individuals 
whose private life is affected by the transmission of public interest stories. In Richard, the High 
Court made it clear that it would challenge the tactics employed by the media,3 including the 
exercise of any editorial judgement on their part, if those tactics, including the motive behind 
them, amounted to a disproportionate interference with individual privacy. In particular, that 
decision suggests that the potential success of any public interest defence relied on by the media 
                                                 
1 [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch. 
2 [2019] EWCA Civ 677 
3 In this sense, tactics may cover the way that the personal information is gathered and/or the manner in which 
that information was portrayed in the broadcast. The author will attempt to stress any differences throughout, 
including the relevance of the broadcaster’s motive in gathering and/or portraying that information. 
might be affected if the court finds that the tactics are employed simply, or substantially, to 
make ‘good television’. That desire on behalf of the BBC was considered by the judge, not 
only as exacerbating the harm caused by those tactics to the claimant’s privacy,4 but also in 
reducing the weight of the public interest arguments when they were balanced against the 
privacy claim.5 In other words, in this context making ‘good television’ was regarded as being 
equivalent to bad broadcasting practice, and something to be discouraged by the law and the 
courts. Consequently, if the court was to find that the broadcaster’s intention was to make ‘good 
television’ - rather than faithfully serve the public interest in publication - the balancing act is 
more likely to be decided in favour of upholding individual privacy.6  
 
It will be conceded later in this article that in both Richard and Ali, the public interest defence 
may have failed for other reasons. Nevertheless, it is contended that the courts’ acceptance of 
the negative factor of ‘good television’ can detract from the strength of any public interest 
defence and thus compromise media freedom and freedom of expression. The recent decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Ali,7 has reminded us that broadcasters are susceptible to legal action 
despite the existence of a public interest story, and that they need to be careful of both their 
tactics and their motives when balancing individual privacy with their desire to inform the 
public on matters of public interest. This is of particular concern when television programmes 
are made to make the public aware of matters of public interest and intended to be watched by 
millions of viewers who regard the programme as entertainment as well as educational. In such 
                                                 
4 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch, at paragraph 292. 
5 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch, at paragraph 300. 
 
6 As is hoped to be illustrated in both Richard and Ali, considered below 
7 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 677, upholding the High Court decision in Ali v Channel 5 
Broadcast Ltd [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch). 
cases the broadcasters obviously consider the potential entertainment value of the programme, 
together with the potential viewing figures; but should that detract from the public interest 
value of the programme and compromise the broadcaster’s public interest defence?   
 
This article will examine the decisions in Richard and Ali to assess the implications of this 
approach on public interest broadcasting and the availability of the public interest defence in 
privacy actions. In particular, it will examine the dilemma facing the courts where a programme 
was made for the dual purpose of fulfilling the public interest and making ‘good television’ 
that will entertain and perhaps sensationalise the story and its telling. It will argue that although 
such tactics might, in some cases, exacerbate the harm caused to the claimant and thus 
justifiably impact on the decision, it is unfair to penalise the media simply because it intended 
to attract a greater audience by making ‘good television’ (or for the tactics employed simply to 
secure that result).  
 
Specifically, it will be argued that given the hybrid status of the media – the public watchdog 
and the private, commercial entity - that the courts should accept the inevitability of the media’s 
intention to engage its audience and make ‘good television’. Consequently, the courts should 
neither give undue weight to the fact that the media wished to broadcast an exclusive, or more 
generally further its commercial and other standing, provided the public interest of the story is 
without question and the tactics employed by the media are otherwise proportionate to the aim 
of broadcasting the public interest story.8  Tied in with this, the article will also argue that the 
                                                 
8 The article will not argue that the decisions in Richard and Ali were unsustainable on their facts, but rather that 
the general tenor of the judgments were overly dismissive of and potentially damaging to media freedom and the 
public interest defence. See Steve Foster, Media Responsibility, Public Interest Broadcasting and the Judgment 
in Richard v BBC’ [2016] 5 EHRLR 490, at 503. See also Thomas Bennett and Paul Wragg, ‘Was Richard v 
courts should be slow to interfere with broadcasting judgement when the programme is made 
for such dual purposes and where the harm caused to individual privacy is not otherwise 
disproportionate to those aims. 
 
The article will also suggest a possible way forward in ensuring that individual privacy is 
protected from irresponsible and sensational broadcasting whilst retaining editorial judgement; 
thus ensuring that media freedom and editorial discretion is not unduly hampered. The article 
suggests that the propriety of media tactics (including, where relevant, their motive) is 
considered primarily (but not exclusively) at the first stage of the court’s enquiry; in other 
words, whether - and to what extent - the claimant’s legitimate expectation of privacy was 
violated.  Following from that, it will argue that this factor should not be taken into account 
when the court is considering the strength of the public interest claim during the second stage 
of its enquiry, unless and in so far as the court has to revisit the strength of the privacy claim 
and the level of intrusion.9 This, it will be argued, will ensure that the courts will primarily use 
the factor of ‘good television’ negatively when it has harmed the privacy interests of the 
claimant; and not to question or dilute what would otherwise be a strong (albeit not trump) 
public interest defence. 
 
                                                 
BBC correctly decided?’ (2018) 23(3) Communications Law 153, at 163, and Jacob Rowbotham, ‘Reporting 
Police Investigations, privacy rights and social stigma: Richard v BBC [2019 Journal of Media Law 115 
9 There is some conflict evident in the case law in this respect: the Court of Appeal in Murray v accepting that 
the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the of the 
publisher goes to the question of reasonable expectation of privacy (at para 36); and the European Court of 
Human Rights regarding the method of obtaining the information as part of the balancing exercise (Springer v 
Germany  (2012) 55 EHRR 6 (at para 93) 
Balancing press freedom and individual privacy: legitimate expectation of 
privacy versus the public interest in free speech 
 
In the post- Human Right Act era, when the right to privacy comes into conflict with free 
speech the courts will need to strike an appropriate balance between the two rights. Section 
12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the courts – under s.12(1) - to have particular 
regard to freedom of expression where freedom of expression is threatened in legal 
proceedings,  and - under s.12(4) - to the extent to which it is, or would be, in the public 
interest for the material to be published.10 That sub-section also requires the court to have 
regard to any relevant privacy code. Post-Act case law has stressed that the court must 
consider Article 10 of the Convention in its entirety, including the exceptions permitted 
within Article 10(2).11 Further, it is not appropriate for the court to give freedom of speech 
additional weight over and above any competing right, such as the right to private life. Thus, 
in Re S (Publicity)12 the House of Lords confirmed that freedom of expression under Article 
10 does not have an automatic ‘trump’ status under the Act; the judge having simply to 
consider the magnitude of the interference proposed and then what steps were necessary to 
prevent or minimise that interference. 
 
Once the court have determined that the claimant’s legitimate expectation of privacy has been 
interfered with, it must then establish whether any public interest in publication exists, and then 
decide whether that public interest justifies the publication or broadcast, including the privacy 
                                                 
10 For a comprehensive coverage of this area, see Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under 
the Human Rights Act OUP 2006, Part IV. 
11 Douglas v Hello! Magazine [2001] 2 WLR 992. 
 
12 [2005] 1 AC 593. 
 
harm it has caused.13  In Richard v BBC, Mann J listed the criteria that is used in conducting 
that balancing exercise and coming to a conclusion where on the facts the balance lies. These 
included: any contribution to a debate of general interest; how well known the person 
concerned is and what is the subject of the report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; 
the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form and consequences 
of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed.14 He also noted that in addition to 
those matters, s.12(4) requires the court to have regard to any relevant privacy code: in the 
present case it the BBC's editorial guidelines.15 The weight given to these factors is obviously 
case-sensitive, and with respect to the media, dependent on the court’s view of the public 
interest value of the story, including whether, and how, that story been pursued by the media.  
 
This article does not argue for the widening of the public interest defence in privacy cases. Nor 
does it question the current distinction between what is in the public interest and what the public 
are interested in.16 Rather, it implores the courts to take a more positive approach to the defence 
where the programmes seeks to entertain as well as inform. It also argues that the courts should 
recognise that such programmes could serve a public interest, despite the intention to entertain 
and create ‘good television’.  
                                                 
13 See Kirsty Hughes, ‘The public figure doctrine and the right to privacy’ [2019] 78(1) CLJ 70, where it is 
argued that at the second stage the courts should consider the factor of whether the publication contributed to a 
matter of public interest, to the exclusion of whether the claimant is or is not a public figure. 
14 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch, at paragraph 276 
15 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch, at paragraph 277 
16 Previous articles have argued for such a widening, and have doubted the approach taken by the domestic 
courts to the public interest defence. See Paul Wragg ‘The benefits of privacy-invading expression’ [2013] 64(2) 
Northern Ireland Quarterly Review 187, and Steve Foster ‘Media Responsibility, Public Interest Broadcasting 
and the Judgment in Richard v BBC’ [2016] 5 EHRLR 490. 
 In general, the public interest defence is activated when the matter under discussion is a matter 
of genuine public interest or debate, thus serving a public and democratic purpose.17 Wragg 
has highlighted that there are three broad, but distinct, interpretations of the term public interest 
at work.18 They are: that the public have the right not to be misled;19 that, as role models, public 
figures must adhere to a higher standard of behaviour;20 and that the media enjoys a general 
freedom to criticise the behaviour of others.21 He also argues that there is a more general public 
interest at play in most cases of privacy-invading expression, beyond asking whether the 
expression furthers the democratic process. This ‘benefits-to-self’ justification is based on the 
idea that by learning of another’s private actions the reader gains a deeper insight of how to 
behave in society and what to expect of others. Furthermore, the audience might modify their 
behaviour in respect of the well-known figure public publically – by for example by not 
supporting that person, or criticising them in private with friends.22  
                                                 
17 In Van Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1. the European Court stated that: ‘...a fundamental distinction 
needs to be made between reporting facts – even controversial ones - capable of contributing to a debate in a 
democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their public functions, for example, and reporting 
details of the private life of an individual who ... does not exercise official functions’ (at paragraph 63) 
18 Paul Wragg ‘The benefits of privacy-invading expression’ [2013] 64(2) Northern Ireland Quarterly Review 
187, at 195. 
19 As seen in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB) and 
McLaren v MGN Ltd [2012] EWHC 2466 (QB) 
20 See Ferdinand and McLaren, above note 17 
21 Terry (Previously LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] EMLR 16 
22 Paul Wragg ‘The benefits of privacy-invading expression’ [2013] 64(2) Northern Ireland Quarterly Review 
187, at 196. Wragg also explores the benefits of encouraging autonomous free speech rights, but this article will 
not pursue those arguments on behalf of specific journalist, editors or broadcasters. 
 In Richard and Ali there was at least a potential public interest in investigating, respectively, 
crime prevention and the issues of debt in modern society. Accordingly, there was a benefit to 
the public in being informed of such events. Further, in Richard there was an argument that the 
broadcast assisted in correcting previous impressions of his image. Those public interest 
defences may have failed for other reasons, but it is clear from those decisions that the courts 
may dilute the legitimacy and extent of that defence because of the tactics employed by the 
media, and/or its motive in broadcasting the story as it did.23 This will of course affect the 
balancing exercise by diluting the weight of the defence, and in certain cases robbing the media 
of the defence altogether. More specifically, judicial questioning of the tactics employed by the 
media will interfere with the latter’s editorial judgement, and excites discussion as to whether 
such interference is acceptable. 
 
Editorial judgement and the balance between media freedom and individual 
privacy 
 
It is now quite clear that the editorial judgement of the media is not beyond enquiry when the 
courts conduct its balance between individual privacy and freedom of expression and press 
freedom. Thus, the media cannot rely exclusively on the public interest character and quality 
of the story to rebut the claimant’s legitimate expectation of privacy.24 At both stages the courts 
                                                 
23 This reason, as we shall see, might not be the sole reason why the public interest defence was rejected or 
outweighed by the privacy claim. 
 
24 In particular, see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 
677; and Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 Ch. 
can be influenced by the tactics employed by the media both in researching the story (in other 
words in enquiring why the programme was made and the lengths the media was prepared to 
go in gathering that information); and in presenting it (in other words how the substance of that 
story is presented). Consideration of the latter consideration (the presentation) follows from 
the courts’ acceptance that the broadcasting and publication of stories by the media is capable 
of causing greater harm to individual privacy than the dissemination and discussion of such 
information by private individuals on social media.25 Consequently, in the context of defending 
privacy claims, the media have greater responsibilities in ensuring that it does not infringe 
individual privacy, and the courts will subject the media to greater scrutiny in this regard; which 
will be duly reflected in the courts’ balancing exercise. This is despite recognition by the 
European Court of Human Rights that the media should have greater discretion, and in some 
cases, immunity, when reporting on matters of public interest.26 Nevertheless, as will be argued 
later, there is less justification for penalising the media with respect to the first consideration 
(the technique of gathering information and the motive for which it is carried out), and little if 
no justification for penalising the media solely for its intention to make ‘good television’.27  
 
                                                 
25 See for example CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB), where an injunction and 
anonymity order were continued despite the claimant’s identity and revelations of his sexual life being posted on 
social media. See also PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] AC 1081, where the Supreme Court upheld an 
injunction to prohibit details of the claimant’s sexual life despite the claimant’s identity and details of their 
sexual affairs being available on social media. 
26 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 245 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 
609, and Turkington v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 77. 
27 In some cases, however the story’s outcome and harm will be a direct product of the tactics employed by the 
media, in which case it is accepted that the harm caused by those tactics are of relevance to the extent they 
represent an unreasonable intrusion into privacy. 
Outside the context of television broadcasting, there is evidence that the domestic courts will 
provide the media with a good deal of editorial judgement, and be tolerant of heavy-handed 
tactics, provided they are satisfied of the public interest value of the story. In these cases, the 
court is prepared to tolerate what would otherwise be clear invasions of privacy by sensational 
reporting if there is a sufficiently strong public interest in covering the story, particularly if the 
claimant is a public figure.28 Nevertheless, the media, and indeed other bodies, may have to 
pay for irresponsible broadcasting or press tactics in appropriate cases, where the public interest 
defence is clearly not strong enough in justifying the courts’ tolerance. This is clearly illustrated 
in Peck v United Kingdom,29 a case primarily concerned with a local authority’s misuse of 
private information and images. but which can still be used as an example of the standards and 
proportionality of propriety of media tactics expected when broadcasting public interest stories. 
This decision exposed the deficiencies of the domestic law of privacy and in the post-Human 
Rights Act era has (indirectly) strengthened the protection of individual privacy when the 
courts are balancing it with press freedom and other interests.  
 
In this case, Geoffrey Peck, who was suffering from depression, was walking down Brentwood 
High Street with a kitchen knife in his hand when he attempted to commit suicide by slitting 
his wrists. Unbeknown to him he was filmed by closed-circuit television, although the footage 
did not show him cutting his wrists. Two months later, the Council issued a press feature in 
their CCTV News, containing two photographs from the footage along with an account of the 
                                                 
28 See AAA v Associated Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ. 554 and Trimingham v Associated Newspapers [2012] 
EWCH 1269 (QB), where the courts tolerated the newspapers’ tactics in revealing and commenting on the extra 
marital affairs of politicians. 
29 (2003) 36 EHRR 41; decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 28 January 2002 
incident,30 and three days after that a local newspaper used a photograph of the incident on a 
front-page article about the operation of the closed circuit television system. In both cases, his 
face had not been specifically masked. The next day an article entitled 'Gotcha' appeared in 
another, local newspaper, with a circulation of approximately 24,000, containing a photograph 
from the footage and describing how the police had defused a potentially dangerous affair. A 
follow-up article was published three days later, using the same photograph.31 The footage was 
then supplied to the producers of the BBC programme 'Crime Beat', which had on average 9 
million viewers. Although the Council imposed a number of conditions relating to its showing, 
including that no one should be identifiable and that all faces should be masked, the applicant's 
face was not masked in trailers for the programme.32  
 
The applicant then made a number of television appearances to complain about the situation 
and complained to the Broadcasting Standards Commission regarding the programme on the 
BBC, alleging an unwarranted infringement of his privacy. The Commission upheld his 
complaints and his complaint to the Independent Television Commission concerning the 
Anglia television programme was upheld because his face had not been properly obscured.33. 
The applicant's complaint to the Press Complaints Commission regarding the article in the 
''Yellow Advertiser'' was dismissed, on the basis that the incidents had taken place in a public 
                                                 
30 The applicant's face was not specifically masked and the article explained that the applicant had been spotted 
with a knife in his hand and that he was clearly unhappy but not looking for trouble. 
31 Evidence suggested that a number of people recognised the applicant, and one day after the publication of the 
last article, Anglia Television broadcast a programme to approximately 350,000 people containing extracts of 
the footage although the applicant's face had been masked at the Council's request. 
32 Despite the producers assuring the Council that his face was masked in the main programme, several of his 
friends and family recognised him from the programme. 
33 As a result of the finding, an apology was given by Anglia TV 
 
place and no criminal stigma had been attached to the applicant. An application for judicial 
review of the Council’s decision to release the footage was also unsuccessful,34 and he applied 
to the European Court of Human Right, relying on Article 8 ECHR, and claiming that the 
disclosure of the footage was an unjustified interference with his right to private life.   
 
The European Court found that the disclosure of the footage by the Council had resulted in a 
serious interference with the applicant's right to respect for private life. It then noted that 
disclosure of such private intimate information could only be justified by an overriding 
requirement in the public interest, and that the disclosure of such information without the 
consent of the individual called for the most careful scrutiny.35 In the Court's view, the aims of 
the coverage and its release did not justify the direct disclosure by the Council to the public of 
stills of the applicant in ''CCTV News'' without it obtaining the applicant's consent or masking 
his identity. Neither could it justify its disclosure to the media without it taking steps to ensure 
so far as possible that his identity would be masked.36  
 
The decision in Peck did much to alert the United Kingdom of the shortcomings of the domestic 
law on privacy, but also provided a useful benchmark with respect to inappropriate and 
irresponsible media techniques that might not pass muster with the European Court, and which 
                                                 
34 R v Brentwood Council, ex parte Peck [1998] CMLR 697. The High Court found that the Council had an 
implied legal power to release such information to other bodies when that was necessary to fulfil its statutory 
power to operate the scheme, and that the Council had not acted irrationally in conveying this particular 
information to the relevant bodies in the manner that it did. 
35 Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371. 
36 Further, the disclosure of the material in CCTV News and to the local newspaper, Anglia Television and the 
BBC, were not accompanied by sufficient safeguards and, thus, constituted a disproportionate and unjustified 
interference with the applicant's private life. 
were then employed by the domestic courts in the post-Human Rights Act era.37 However, it is 
the extent to which the courts (both European and domestic), are prepared to interfere with 
editorial judgement and media tactics that determine the success or failure of press freedom 
cases in privacy claims, and which is of interest to the debate surrounding media judgement 
and the effect of editorial tactics on the public interest defence.  
 
The early case law under the Human Rights Act indicated that the courts would be reluctant to 
interfere with the editorial judgement of the press in respect of how they present the story. 
Thus, in Av B plc,38 Lord Woolf LJ stated that: 
 
‘Once it is accepted that the freedom of the press should prevail, then the form of 
reporting in the press is not a matter for the courts but for the Press Complaints 
Commission and the customers of the newspaper concerned.’39 
 
That case has since been discredited on other grounds40 and the above dicta certainly does not 
represent the current approach of either the European or domestic courts in terms of both the 
legitimate expectation of privacy, and the scope and application of the public interest defence.41 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the domestic courts will provide the media with a great 
                                                 
37 See for example, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, and Mosely v News Group Newspapers [2008] 
EMLR 20. 
38 A v B plc [2003] QB 93. 
 
39 [2003] QB 93, at para 48 
 
40 In other words, that sexual activity outside marriage or a permanent relationship do not enjoy any significant 
expectation of privacy. 
41 See the decisions in McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194, and Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 247. 
 
deal of editorial judgement, and be tolerant of heavy-handed tactics, provided they are satisfied 
of the public interest value of the story.42 Equally, Lord Woolf’s opinion would only hold if it 
were accepted that freedom of the press should prevail, and it is now quite clear that the mere 
presence of a public interest in the story does not automatically trump the legitimate 
expectations of privacy of the claimant.43 Accordingly, in Campbell v MGN Ltd, 44 Lord Hope 
stated that the tactics employed by the press were no longer a matter of pure editorial policy, 
but now had to be viewed in the context of infringement of privacy: 
 
‘…..The choice of language used to convey information and ideas, and decisions as to 
whether or not to accompany the printed word by the use of photographs, are pre-
eminently editorial matters with which the court will not interfere. The respondents 
are also entitled to claim that they should be accorded a reasonable margin of 
appreciation in taking decisions as to what details needed to be included in the article  
to give it credibility. This is an essential part of the journalistic exercise. 
 
But decisions about the publication of material that is private to the individual raise 
issues that are not simply about presentation and editing. Any interference with the 
public interest in disclosure has to be balanced against the interference with the right 
of the individual to respect for their private life…Any restriction of the right to 
                                                 
42 See AAA v Associated Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ. 554 and Trimingham v Associated Newspapers [2012] 
EWCH 1269 (QB), where the courts tolerated the newspapers’ tactics in revealing and commenting on the extra 
marital affairs of politicians. 
43  The media will, therefore, have to satisfy the more exacting tests laid down in Campbell and McKennitt, 
which gave greater protection to individual privacy. 
44 [2004] 2 AC 457 
freedom of expression must be subjected to very close scrutiny. But so too must any 
restriction of the right to respect for private life.’45 
 
This reflects the change in jurisprudence in privacy and press freedom cases at the domestic 
level,46 as well as the need to ensure that individual privacy is adequately protected against 
media intrusion in accordance with the principles laid down by the European Court of Human 
Rights.47 The courts have to balance both rights by looking at the respective strength of each 
claim, the level of interference with each right, and by employing proportionality so that 
freedom of expression is not given trump status.48 Nevertheless, there is a difference between 
accommodating responsible journalism and broadcasting in assessing the harm caused to the 
individual’s privacy - and indeed reflecting that in the strength of the countervailing public 
interest defence - and penalising the media (at either stage) because they pursued a public 
interest story for their own gain, or to entertain its audience. The latter motives, it is argued, 
are the inevitable consequences of media activity and should not tell against the media unless 
they have acted in bad faith, or have otherwise employed a tactic that causes greater harm to 
the victim than is appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
Despite the desire to protect individual privacy, the courts have stressed the importance of 
editorial judgement and cautioned against interference in cases where the story is written (or 
broadcast) on a matter of public interest. Thus, in Axel Springer v Germany,49 the European 
                                                 
45 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, at paras 112-113. 
46 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above and McKennit v Ash [2006] EMLR 10, upheld on appeal [2007] 3 WLR 194 
 
47 Most notably, those principles established in the case of Von Hannover v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 7 
 
48 Re S (Publicity) [2005] 1 AC 593. 
49 (2012) 55 EHRR 6 
Court stressed that it was not ‘for the court…to substitute its own views for those of the press 
as to what techniques should be adopted.’50 Again, in Jersild v Austria,51 the European Court 
noted that: 
 
‘…it was not for this Court, nor for the national courts, for that matter, to substitute 
their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be 
adopted by journalists. In this context the court recalls that article 10 protects not only 
the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they 
are conveyed.’’52 (italics added) 
 
Further, at the domestic level, in Campbell v MGN Ltd,53 Lord Hoffmann stated that it would 
be ‘inconsistent with the approach that has been taken by the courts in a number of recent 
landmark decisions for a newspaper to be held strictly liable for what a judge considers to have 
been necessary. In his Lordship’s view, editorial decisions have to be made quickly and with 
less information than is available to a court, which afterwards reviews the matter at leisure.54 
Earlier in his judgment, Lord Hoffmann stressed that judges are not newspaper editors, and that 
                                                 
50 (2012) 55 EHRR 6, at para 81 
51 Jersild v Denmark (1994) 19 EHRR 1. 
52 (1994) 19 EHRR 1, at para 31. See also Fressoz v France (2001) 31 EHRR 28, at para 54, where the Court 
stressed that Article 10 leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to produce material to 
reproduce material 
53 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
54 [2004] 2 AC 457.at para 62 
it is harsh to criticise an editor for ‘‘painting a somewhat fuller picture in order to show the 
claimant in a sympathetic light.’’55 
 
Returning to the decision in Peck, although the litigation centered round the local authority’s 
actions, the tactics employed by both the newspapers and the television in that case were wholly 
unsympathetic and dismissive of individual privacy. Whether their intention was to make good 
television, those tactics caused identifiable harm to the victim and should be considered by the 
courts in assessing any breach of privacy and the application of the public interest defence. The 
same could be said of the tactics employed in both Richard and Ali, considered below: the BBC 
and Channel 5 decided to employ certain tactics in broadcasting the public interest story; and 
the courts, arguably quite justifiably, decided that those tactics intruded disproportionally with 
the claimants’ privacy.  
 
Editorial judgement and the tactics employed by the media are indeed capable of affecting the 
strength of the claimant’s privacy claim, and can be considered as a factor in the balancing 
exercise alongside the strength of the public interest story and the professional conduct of the 
media. Thus, once the court has found that the tactics have seriously infringed the claimant’s 
privacy, that invasion can only be justified if there is a sufficiently strong public interest in 
broadcasting that information. Yet what is unacceptable and potentially damaging to media 
freedom is if the media is expected to devote their story entirely to the public interest, and not 
to consider whether the story will entertain or make ‘good television’. The next section of the 
                                                 
55 [2004] 2 AC 457, at para 59. Note, in this case, Lord Hofmann appears to be persuaded that the photographs 
of the claimant were used in order to put her in a sympathetic light and thus to highlight her personal plight; 
rather than to expose her behaviour, or humiliate her. 
article considers this argument, specifically in the context of the recent decisions in Richard 
and Ali, in order to assess the potential dangers of this trend to penalise the media. 
 
Making ‘good television’ and losing the public interest defence 
 
This section of the article examines the case where the public interest in the broadcast is not in 
doubt, but where the court rejects, or substantially reduces that interest because it feels that the 
broadcaster’s intention was to make ‘good television’ rather than serve the public interest. This 
section will not argue that the media should not be subject to any interference with its editorial 
judgement or be subject to principles of good broadcasting. Rather, it argues that the motive to 
make ‘good television’ is inevitable when the media decide to make a programme, even on a 
matter of genuine and serious public interest, and that that fact alone should not unduly reduce 
the public interest defence. 
 
Before we examine the arguments and the relevant case law, it is worth highlighting two 
dilemmas inherent in controlling the activities of the media. First, the media have an undoubted 
public role to play as public watchdog and as a conduit between news items and the public,56 
but at the same time are private bodies with private interests. This dilemma is neatly summed 
up by Lord Donaldson MR: 
 
‘The “Media”… are an essential foundation of any democracy. In exposing crime, anti-
social behaviour and hypocrisy and in campaigning for reform and propagating the 
                                                 
56 This has been accepted in particular in the law of defamation: see the decision of the House of Lords in 
Turkington v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 277. 
views of minorities, they perform an invaluable function. However, they are peculiarly 
vulnerable to the error of confusing the public interest with their own interest. Usually 
these interests march hand in hand, but not always.57 
 
It is, of course, the reaction of the judiciary to that dilemma, and its attitude towards the media’s 
proper role in a democracy, that will determine the success of any public interest defence in 
the overall balancing exercise. Thus, if the courts start from the premise that the media is in 
essence a public body, there to serve the general public interest and to comply with strict 
standards on how they collate and disseminate information to the public, then the basic tenets 
of media freedom may be lost.58 This role is not performed as a formal public body and as an 
arm of the state, but as a watchdog of the public interest, albeit operating in the private sphere, 
and with a duty to follow the rules of professional broadcasting in order to respect individual 
privacy interests to an appropriate degree.59 
 
Secondly, and related to the first (general) dilemma, most, although not all, media organisations 
are involved in both informing and ‘entertaining’ its audience. If news items were presented 
purely as fact and as a vehicle for academic or other reflection, the media, and in particular the 
broadcasting industry, would not function in either of its capacities. In the vast majority of 
cases, broadcasters and newspapers are not producing programmes and articles for pure 
academic or intellectual interest – as might a law journal, or other publications such as The 
                                                 
57 Francome v Daily Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 WLR 892, at 898 
58 See Steve Foster, ‘Media Responsibility, Public Interest Broadcasting and the Judgment in Richard v BBC’ 
[2016] 5 EHRLR 490, at 491 
59 Ibid. Hence, in the Cliff Richard case the BBC should have fulfilled its duty by continuing to collaborate with 
the police and refusing to carry out its own investigations and broadcast. 
Economist. They produce news and stories both to inform and entertain (or at least to engage 
the audience beyond the mere dissemination of objective facts), and in the context of a 
competitive market and the need to serve the public desire to be engaged and of the broadcaster 
or publisher to sell their product. 
 
On the other hand, editorial judgement and motive need to be checked.  Individuals such as the 
claimants in the Richard and Ali cases are not willing participants in the stories, unlike 
participants in many reality shows; and in Ali we were dealing with wholly private 
individuals.60 Programmes exposing certain individuals for their criminal or anti-social 
behaviour are watched and enjoyed by millions of viewers: all under the justification of the 
public benefit in exposing such individuals. These programmes and indeed all public interest 
stories are produced knowing that they will have an entertainment value: whether it is the 
satisfaction in seeing a public figure getting their comeuppance, or, more cruelly, witnessing 
private individuals carrying out embarrassing acts. Obviously, these programmes and stories 
cannot be broadcast irrespective of the harm or embarrassment caused to that individual. Such 
individuals have redress in appropriate cases and may bring claims based on breach of 
privacy.61 In these cases, the court has to balance two competing rights (privacy and free 
speech), and a key factor in determining whether any interference with privacy is proportionate 
and necessary on the facts is the extent to which the broadcast or other public dissemination 
serves the public interest. However, is it right that the public interest defence is compromised 
if it can be shown that the programme was intended to become ‘good television’?  
                                                 
60 The court rejected the claim that one of the tenants was a public figure because he had been involved in local 
politics. 
61 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. This case established the action of misuse of private information, 
developed from the common law action in confidentiality. 
 The danger of making ‘good television’ and the decision in Richard v BBC 
 
The impact on privacy claims and the strength of a public interest defence when a court accepts 
that a programme was made to create ‘good television’ is clearly illustrated in the High Court 
decision in Richard v BBC.62 In that case, the claimant, Sir Cliff Richard, claimed damages for 
breach of his right to privacy against the first defendant BBC when it had revealed that he was 
being investigated for sex offences, and produced numerous broadcasts of the police search; 
including the use of helicopters to catch images of the claimant’s property. The High Court had 
to determine whether the claimant had a legitimate expectation of privacy, and whether any 
interference with that right was justified by the BBC’s right to freedom of expression, together 
with any damages payable by it.  
 
The facts and background to the case were particularly relevant to the final ruling,63 having an 
undoubted influence on the judge’s approach to both the privacy issue and the availability of 
the public interest defence. A BBC journalist had discovered from a confidential source – 
believed to be someone from the police force that was aware of the police investigation - that 
the police force was investigating the claimant in respect of an allegation of historical sex 
abuse.64 Subsequently, the police had agreed to give the journalist advance notice of a search 
of the claimant's English property, and the BBC then revealed that the claimant was being 
                                                 
62 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch) 
 
63 The full facts and analysis of the witness statement are detailed in paragraphs 1-148 of the transcript 
 
64 The investigation was part of ‘Operation Yewtree’ into historical sex abuse. 
investigated and produced numerous broadcasts of the search; including the use of helicopters 
to catch images of the claimant’s property.65 The police investigation continued for two years, 
but the claimant was never arrested or charged.66    
 
Giving judgment on whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of 
the matters relating to the police investigation, Mann J, cited Sir Anthony Clarke’s dicta in 
Murray v Express Newspapers plc,67 where he formulated the matters that should be taken into 
account in deciding whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Having done 
so the judge felt that the last two factors - the effect of the publication on the claimant, and the 
circumstances in which, and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the 
publisher68 - were capable of being very relevant to the present case.69 This reflected the judge’s 
disapproval of the BBC’s tactics, both in the manner in which they gathered the information 
and in the way in which the programme was broadcasted, including what was broadcast.  
 
Whilst it is not argued that the judge was entitled to consider those factors at the first, and 
indeed the second stage, it is argued that the judge’s disquiet of the BBC’s tactics and the belief 
that BBC had reported the story to make ‘good television’ may have led to a distortion in the 
balancing act. Thus, with respect to the balancing exercise between the claimant’s Article 8 
                                                 
65 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch.), at paragraph 224. In his summary of the facts, Mann J concluded that that the 
journalist had misled the police force and the media personnel into believing that the journalist knew more of 
the operation than he actually did. Further, he had impliedly threatened the force that if they did not confirm the 
allegation and proffer further information he would reveal the story before the planned arrest.  
66 Eventually the police admitted liability and agreed to pay £400,000 in damages to the claimant.  
67 [2009] Ch. 481  
68 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2009] Ch. 481, at paragraph 36 
69 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 231. 
rights and those of the BBC under Article 10 of the Convention,70 the judge was clearly critical 
of the way in which the BBC had acquired the information.71 These factors, in the judge’s view, 
clearly weakened the BBC’s position;72 in the judge’s view, the impact of the invasion was 
materially increased by the nature of the BBC's coverage, which had added drama and a degree 
of sensationalism.73 Thus, the judge concluded that the BBC went in for an invasion of Sir 
Cliff’s privacy in a big way,74 and in assessing the question of whether the story contributed to 
a debate of public interest, the judge stated that: 
 
                                                 
70 The European Court of Human Rights in Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 stated that its 
role was not to balance freedom of expression with countervailing interests, but rather to uphold freedom of 
expression subject to narrowly construed exceptions. However, it is now accepted that when it is pitted against 
another fundamental human right, the courts must balance the two rights equally, employing proportionality to 
decide which right takes precedence on the facts. This is reflected in domestic case law: Re S (Publicity) [2005] 
1 AC 593. 
71 That is, through a source who was clearly acting wrongfully, and of the veiled threat they had made to the 
police that they would release the story themselves if not provided with the necessary information. Thus the 
judge noted that it was very significant that the publication started with obviously private and sensitive 
information, obtained from someone who, to the BBC journalist's knowledge, ought not to have revealed it, and 
confirmed or bolstered with a ploy in the form of a perceived threat by the journalist to the police that ought not 
to have been made, namely that he would publish the story before the police search: Cliff Richard v BBC and 
The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 293 
 
72 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 292. 
73 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 300.  
74 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 301. 
‘For what it is worth, I do not believe that this justification was much in the minds of 
those at the BBC at the time. I think that they, or most of them, were far more impressed 
by the size of the story and that they had the opportunity to scoop their rivals.75 
 
Further, in deciding that the BBC did not quite comply with the ethical requirements of its 
journalism at that stage, the judge suggests that the real reason for that was that it was giving a 
lot of weight, in its own deliberations, to preserving the exclusivity of its own scoop: 
 
‘The material at trial demonstrated not only that people were very excited at the 
prospect of this scoop, but also that they were very keen to preserve it as their own. I 
emphasise that I am not finding that there is anything inherently wrong with a desire to 
beat a rival to a story. What happened in this case was that that view unduly skewed 
other judgements that had to be made.’76 
 
Finally, the judge noted that the facts of the narrative were presented with a significant degree 
of breathless sensationalism:  
 
‘There was an attempt to lend drama to the broadcast by showing cars entering the 
property, and the helicopter shots added more, somewhat false, drama. It may have 
made for more entertaining and attention-grabbing journalism. It may be justifiable or 
explicable on the footing that TV is a visual medium and pictures are part of what it 
does…but I still consider that the main purpose of utilising the helicopter was to add 
                                                 
75 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 280 
 
76 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 295 
 
sensationalism and emphasis to the scoop of which the BBC was so proud. The BBC 
viewed this as a big story, and presented it in a big way.77’ 
 
It has been argued previously that the judge’s reaction to the tactics employed by the BBC led 
to him ignoring the public interest element of the broadcast and downgrading the fact that the 
investigation concerned matters which were part of an undoubted and serious public debate.78 
For the purposes of the present article, it is accepted that it was valid to consider the BBC’s 
tactics in gathering the information - and what it chose to show - in assessing the proportionality 
of the media’s invasion into individual privacy. Mann J’s judgment in Richard justifiably relies 
heavily on the tactics employed by the BBC in the both the gathering of the information and 
the subsequent dissemination of the news item. Thus, the author accepts that it is appropriate 
to consider whether a public interest story and defence should be affected by what the court 
regards as irresponsible journalism. However, what may be of concern is that the court could 
regard a tactic as irresponsible simply because of its motive: that it was executed in order to 
steal a march on competitors, or to make entertaining and ‘good television’. Such a finding 
may be predicated on the assumption that it is wrong for the media to make and broadcast 
programmes for that reason. Thus, the decision in Richard is probably sound on its facts: the 
public interest in the story did not justify that level of intrusion and the intensity of the tactics. 
Nevertheless, the tenor of the ruling might indicate that, in general, the media may lose its 
public interest defence whenever the main, or substantial, motive is to make good television. 
In other words, that the clear public interest in a story might be negated because the media’s 
                                                 
77 [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch), at paragraph 300-301 
78 Steve Foster, ‘Media Responsibility, Public Interest Broadcasting and the Judgment in Richard v BBC’ [2016] 
5 EHRLR 490, at 499-500 
 
desire was to gain commercially or to sensationalise, rather than inform. Such motives, it is 
argued, are an inevitable element of making programmes, and unless that has 
disproportionately affected the privacy interests of the claimant, should not inform the court’s 
balancing process.79 Equally, to berate the media for revelling in its own investigative 
activities, and to guard the exclusivity of such stories, is, it is submitted, unrealistic and 
damaging where such investigations concern such high matters of public interest, such as a 
bona fide investigation into sex crimes. 
 
The danger of making ‘good’ television and the decision in Ali 
 
The decision in Richard was followed most recently by the Court of Appeal in Ali v Channel 
5,80 a case concerning the public broadcasting on television of a family’s eviction from their 
home. The High Court decision in that case,81 with which the Court of Appeal agreed, was 
decided before Richard, but in any case, both courts used the fact that programme makers had 
made ‘good’ and sensational television at the expense of individual privacy in upholding the 
claim, thus possibly diluting the strength of the broadcaster’s public interest defence. 
 
                                                 
79 More generally, it is argued that the courts should not use breaches of professional journalism as the focal 
point of their decision.  This was made clear in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2007] 1 AC 359, a 
defamation case on whether the public interest defence should be available to the press. In that case, the House 
of Lords held that the ultimate question must be whether publication was in the public interest, and not whether 
the media have broken the rules of professional journalism; their Lordships stressing that the standard of 
conduct needed to be applied by a newspaper needed to be applied in a practical and flexible manner. 
80 [2019] EWCA Civ.677 
 
81 [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch) 
In this case, the claimants brought an action for damages against the defendant television 
production company for misuse of their private information. Due to rent arrears, the landlord 
obtained a High Court writ of possession against the claimant and when enforcement officers 
attended the property to evict the claimants they were accompanied by the defendant's film 
crew; the landlord's father also attended. The first claimant, who was the voluntary media 
secretary of a Muslim political party, was awoken as they entered the property and was given 
an hour to vacate. The second claimant returned after taking her children to school. Various 
exchanges took place during the hour, but shortly before they vacated the first claimant agreed 
to be interviewed. Subsequently, the landlord's father posted two videos he had recorded of the 
eviction on social media. The defendant then broadcast edited footage as part of a series of 
programmes called "Can't Pay? We'll take it away". The programme containing the claimants 
was seen by 9.65 million viewers and the claimants' daughter suffered bullying at school as a 
result of the broadcast.   The claimants accepted that the writ was a public court order and that 
the defendant was entitled to broadcast the fact that they had been evicted. However, they 
contended that as the programme included filming of them in their home, in distress and being 
taunted by the landlord's father, it was in breach of their right to respect for private and family 
life. In response, the defendant argued that the programme addressed matters of real public 
concern, namely the public reporting of increased levels of debt, dependence on housing benefit 
and the effect of enforcement of writs of possession by High Court enforcement officers. 
 
In the High Court, judgment was given in favour of the claimants. After finding that the 
claimants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information,82 the Court 
proceeded to balance the claimant’s article 8 rights with the defendant’s rights under article 10. 
                                                 
82 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch), at paragraphs 145, 158, 162-163, 169. 
Although it accepted that the programme contributed to a debate of general interest, it found 
that the inclusion of the claimant's private information went beyond what was justified for that 
purpose.83 In the Court’s view, the programme's focus was not on the matters of public interest, 
but on the drama of the conflict between the claimants and the landlord's father. Further, that 
conflict had been encouraged by one of the enforcement officers to ‘make good television,’84 
– the officer saying to the landlord, ‘say whatever you like, just give it some wellie, you know 
it makes good television.’85 
 
The judge concluded that the claimants had not established that the programme was unfair or 
inaccurate, and the defendant had editorial discretion as to the way in which it told the story. 
However, in his view that discretion did not extend to its decision to include the private 
information of which the claimants' complained unless it was justified as contributing to a 
debate of general interest.86 On the facts, therefore, the balance came down in favour of 
protecting the claimants' article 8 rights and the defendant had failed to convince the court that 
this intrusion was justified and proportionate.87  
 
As with the decision in Richard, the High Court was prepared to interfere with editorial 
discretion if it unjustifiably interfered with individual privacy, and to reduce the weight of the 
public interest defence if the focus of the programme was the relaying of the drama of the 
event. Before the Court of Appeal, the broadcasters submitted that the judge had interfered 
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84 [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch), at paragraph 120 
85 As the Court of Appeal noted, the intentions of the officers to make good television should have been 
apparent to the film crew and the editorial team: [2019] EWCA Civ. 677, at para 57. 
86 [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch),at paragraph 120 
 
87 [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch), at paragraph 120 
with the legitimate exercise of editorial discretion in balancing the respective rights under 
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, and had taken too narrow a view of what was in the public 
interest. With respect to editorial discretion, the Court of Appeal noted that the preponderance 
of authority from Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd88 through to Richard v BBC,89 
established that editorial discretion could not render lawful an interference with privacy that 
could not rationally be justified by reference to any public interest served by publication.90 
Further, the Court of Appeal stressed that where there was a rational view by which the public 
interest could justify publication, particularly giving full weight to editorial knowledge and 
discretion, then the court should be slow to interfere.91  
 
In the present case, in the Court of Appeal’s view it was clear that the issues underlying the 
programme were of real public interest and extended well beyond the specifics of the High 
Court process.92 There was a proper general public interest in the whole human story of debt, 
eviction and the consequences on families, and it was hard to see how those matters could be 
illustrated in any documentary without interfering with the privacy of those most affected.93 
On the other hand, although lack of good faith had not been alleged, it seemed clear that the 
agent had an eye to the impact on "good television" and might have encouraged the landlord 
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91 [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 83 
 
92 [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 84 
 
93  [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 84 
 
accordingly.94 The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the judge at first instance despite 
reservations of how he had dealt with the public interest defence in general, and editorial 
discretion in particular. Thus, Lord Justice Irwin noted that popular documentary television 
was an accepted form and that those instrumental in the broadcast disavowed any bias or 
skewed presentation. Further, the narrative contained the account of both parties, at least to 
some degree.95 His Lordship then stated that the court had some reservations about the judge’s 
treatment of the public interest defence. These reservations included that his approach to the 
public interest issues was too narrow; that he had failed to place on the scales the other matters 
of public interest in the programme and, more broadly in the series as a whole; and that he had 
made inadequate allowance for the exercise of editorial discretion.96 Yet despite these 
reservations, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision because the judge was aware of the 
relevant legal principles, and, in particular, with the warning that a court should be slow to 
interfere with editorial discretion,97 and had on the facts attached weight to a range of public 
interest issues.98 
 
As will be argued below, the courts’ recognition that the broadcasters had ensured that the 
recording of the incident made ‘‘good television’’ - thus reducing the weight of the genuine 
public interest in making and broadcasting the programme - could lead to an unjustified 
interference with media freedom and editorial discretion. In the context of television 
programmes such as the one in Ali, it is inevitable that the programme is being made for both 
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97 [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 92 
 
98 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 93 
informative and entertainment purposes. Although such tactics can impact (further) on 
individual privacy, the public interest features of the programme should not be dismissed solely 
because of the tactics employed by the broadcasters. In particular, those features should not be 
dismissed (or substantially diminished) solely because the broadcaster’s intention was to make 
a more entertaining programme – ‘good television’. The Court of Appeal’s approach in this 
case - that the appeal court should not interfere with the judge’s ruling unless satisfied that it 
did not represent a reasonable view of the evidence,99 does little to address the complex and 
delicate issue of editorial discretion and the courts’ role in monitoring any interference with it. 
More specifically, it does not address the question of whether and to what extent courts such 
have regard to the media’s intention in creating ‘good television’ when conducting the overall 
balance between privacy and media freedom. On the facts, the broadcast, including the 
broadcaster’s tactics, may have unreasonably interfered with the claimant’s privacy, 
particularly as the ‘victims’ were private individuals and family members. However, to confirm 
that decision by relying on the factor of ‘good television’ is both inappropriate and damaging 
to media freedom, particularly where the appeal court had reservation about the trial judge’s 
approach to the public interest issues. 
 
Overall reflections on editorial discretion and the need to avoid making 
‘good television’ 
 
The dilemma that we face in these cases is that individuals may need protection from the effects 
of sensational and unprofessional tactics employed by the media in reporting public interest 
stories. This is because both domestic and European case law recognise that investigative 
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journalism can cause harm to individual privacy, and that excessive coverage or tactics can 
cause further harm.100 On the other hand, the law must ensure that the media are free to report 
such stories within their own editorial discretion. More specifically, we face the dilemma of 
whether to penalise the media, perhaps at both stages of the enquiry, when it indulges in what 
the courts regard as sensational tactics in order to make ‘good television.’ This section of the 
article provides a possible compromise by suggesting that the factor of sensational tactics is 
employed principally (but not exclusively) at the first stage of the court’s enquiry and 
suggesting that that that factor is given little credence at the second stage (aside from revisiting 
the level of intrusion into individual privacy caused  by the story). More specifically, it will be 
argued that the media’s intention to make ‘good television’ should not be relevant on its own, 
in the absence of evidence that this was manifested in actions that caused disproportionate harm 
to individual privacy. This will allow the court to respect the hybrid status of the media and its 
editorial discretion in considering the application of the public interest defence, whilst 
reflecting the detrimental effects of sensational broadcasting on individual privacy. 
 
Before examining this further, let us recap on the effect of the major cases in this area. The 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Peck v United Kingdom provided the 
domestic courts, and broadcasting authorities and the media generally, useful guidance on the 
need of the latter to accommodate the right of individual privacy when carrying out their 
broadcasting and other duties. That decision not only exposed the weakness of domestic 
privacy laws, but also provided (albeit indirectly) a stark warning to broadcasting and other 
authorities of the respect they need to show to individual privacy. On the facts, no one would 
have any serious reservations regarding the decision – that Peck had been subject to an 
unnecessary intrusion into his private life, exacerbated by the tactics and lack of 
                                                 
100 Von Hannover v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 7, and PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] AC 1081. 
professionalism shown by all the authorities, including the media, even though they were not 
in the dock as such. Of course, such tactics are also relevant to the availability of any public 
interest defence, but in some cases, by the time the court considers the Article 10 issues, the 
battle is almost lost. In these cases, no possible public interest could justify those tactics, as 
they had been employed with no consideration of the individual’s privacy (possibly, because 
at that time there was no legal obligation to consider that issue). 
 
The key issue is now proportionality, and a careful balancing by the courts of the conflicting 
interests to show that any interference with private and family is necessary and proportionate 
to the aim of protecting freedom of expression, as required by the qualifying provision in 
Article 8(2). Further, in these cases, a key factor in determining whether the interference is 
proportionate and necessary (assuming that the claimant can satisfy the court that they had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy), is the extent to which the broadcast or other public 
dissemination serves the public interest. The courts’ findings in Ali and Richard that the 
programmes, albeit broadcast on public interest matters, were not focussed on those matters 
but rather on the drama of the conflict between the claimants and the landlord's father, is of 
some concern to broadcasters and those interested in the free dissemination of public interest 
speech. Unlike Peck, where the focus is on the effect of the tactics (of the local authority) on 
the individual, the courts in Richard and Ali criticise the media for aiming to make good 
television, and thereby questioning the bona fides of the public interest defence in cases where 
the media have a dual purpose in making the programme. 
 
Thus, in Ali the High Court and Court of Appeal accept that the conflict between the tenants 
and the landlord had been encouraged by one of the enforcement officers to "make good 
television" - thus reducing the genuine public interest in making and broadcasting the 
programme.101 It is submitted that this distinction between serving the public interest and 
making good or sensational television will be very difficult to maintain in practice, as many 
public interest stories are presented with mixed motives – to inform the public and to score 
political or personal points or entertain the audience.  In the context of television programmes 
such as the one in Ali, it is inevitable that the programme is being made for both informative 
and entertainment purposes. Thus, for the courts to try to ascertain which of those purposes 
dominated in a particular case for ascertaining the success of any public interest defence will 
be both difficult and, for the reasons outlined above, potentially unfair.  
 
That is not to argue, that the decision or outcome in Ali was necessarily unfair or wrong. The 
tactics employed by the broadcasters undoubtedly furthered the harm caused to the claimants 
– private individuals being filmed in their home - and the broadcasters should pay for that 
misjudgement when the court is assessing the strength of the privacy claim and whether, on 
balance, that intrusion was justified by any countervailing public interest. Yet to question that 
the media are attempting to carry out their public interest role in such cases is another matter, 
and may lead to a disproportionate burden being placed on broadcasters, together with the loss 
of the public interest defence in more appropriate cases. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
Court of Appeal refused to question the High Court’s weighting of both the public interest issue 
and the extent to which it had allowed sufficient editorial discretion.102 
 
Similarly, in Richard, the public interest argument of the BBC was reduced and to some extent 
negated because of the tactics that it employed in both gathering the information and in 
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broadcasting it as it did,103  because the court questions the bona fides of the defence. These 
tactics, as has been conceded, are relevant to the decision on the overall proportionality of the 
media’s interference with the claimant’s privacy rights. However, it should not be allowed to 
dominate the balancing exercise if, as was clear in Richard, the investigation and broadcast 
concerned, initially at least, a matter of great public interest and debate. The tactics employed 
by the BBC clearly increased the harm caused to the claimant’s privacy, and this factor was 
rightly reflected in the court’s assessment of the strength of the claimant’s expectation of 
privacy, and in the assessment of damages.104 Yet, several parts of the judge’s findings are 
predicated on the basis that the broadcasters in that case, and the media generally, should not 
concern themselves with making sensational and good television, stealing a march on its 
competitors, or boasting of its achievements in reporting the matter. This, it is argued, is 
inconsistent with editorial discretion, the hybrid status of the media, and the reality of making 
and reporting of public interest programmes. Further, these factors, as Lord Justice Irwin 
concedes in Ali, are the products of popular documentary television as an accepted form.105 
 
The decisions in Ali and Richard are a reminder to broadcasters and the media generally that 
they must carry out their research and reporting in a responsible manner and be mindful of an 
                                                 
103 See Jacob Rowbotham, ‘Reporting Police Investigations, privacy rights and social stigma: Richard v BBC 
[2019 Journal of Media Law 115, at 127.  Here the author sounds a general warning about the judge’s dicta in 
Richard: ‘While it is clear that Mann J was unimpressed with the conduct of the BBC, the ruling may have 
significant implications for media reporting, which will need to be addressed in future cases. 
104 Unless one argues that, the claimant’s expectation of privacy was substantially reduced by his fame and 
Christian views. This argument will not be re-examined in this article, but see Steve Foster, Media 
Responsibility, Public Interest Broadcasting and the Judgment in Richard v BBC’ [2016] 5 EHRLR 490, at 500-
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105 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 677, at paragraph 89. 
individual’s privacy and Convention rights. In both Richard and Ali, it could be argued that on 
the facts it was appropriate to interfere with the editorial judgement of the media and thus 
protect individuals from an unreasonable and unnecessary intrusion into their private lives. 
This will be acceptable provided these cases are rare, and do not intrude too greatly on 
broadcasting freedom and the public right to receive public interest information. However, the 
courts need to develop a clear and coherent set of principles that clearly distinguish between 
unprofessional and unacceptable journalism and reasonable and inevitable press tactics in 
creating a story that not only informs but which engages and entertains the audience. Further, 
appeal courts need to be more robust in questioning the application of those rules by courts of 
first instance. If this is not ensured, then many public interest defences will fail in situations 
where the public interest value of the story is strong and the resultant intrusion into privacy is 
justifiable.  
 
Most importantly, the courts must accept that the media will and must try to make ‘good 
television’, including, and perhaps especially, in cases where the story has a high public 
interest. Media bodies are not formal public bodies and should not be expected to act as if they 
were carrying out a public office and function. Of course, they are recognised as carrying out 
a public service and benefit – providing information to the public on matters of public interest. 
However, that should not mean that the courts should ignore the fact that they need to survive 
commercially in a competitive field by attracting its audience, and engaging and at times 
entertaining that audience. 
 
Conclusions  
Insofar as the decisions in Richard and Ali attempt to impose standards of responsible 
broadcasting on programme makers, and consider that factor in the both the first stage and, to 
a lesser extent, the overall balancing exercise, the decisions are unobjectionable. However, 
where courts take into account the broadcaster’s purpose to entertain in order to reduce the 
public interest nature of the broadcast, we need to be careful that the courts do not ignore the 
public interest value of the broadcast simply or mainly because the media wished to make a 
‘good’ programme or story. Not only are the media private companies who do and must make 
a profit, they are responsive to their readership to, within reason, entertain their readers or 
audience More specifically, we need to ensure that programmes made by certain companies, 
and broadcast on certain channels, are not assumed to have been made for purely financial or 
prurient reasons. 
 
One way in which this can be achieved, is to concentrate the enquiry into media tactics at the 
first stage, and assess the impact of those tactics on the victim’s privacy. This will more easily 
assess the media’s responsibility for harming individual privacy, rather than questioning their 
motives and editorial discretion at the second stage of the enquiry. Of course, their motives and 
tactics have some relevance to the success of the public interest defence and the overall 
balancing exercise because the level of intrusion has to be justified by that public interest. 
However, by focussing attention on that factor at the first stage it is hoped that the courts will 
refrain from making general statements with respect to the media’s motives that are both 
harmful to media freedom and unreflective of the true status of modern broadcasting and 
publishing. 
 
Most importantly, the courts must accept that the media will and must try to make ‘good 
television’, including, and perhaps especially, in cases where the story has a high public 
interest. Media bodies are not expected to act as if they were carrying out a formal public 
function.  Of course, they are regarded as carrying out a public service and benefit – providing 
information to the public on matters of public interest – but that should not mean that we have 
to ignore the fact that they need to survive commercially in a competitive field by attracting its 
audience and engaging and, at times, entertaining that audience. The author accepts the point 
that the media have survived despite fears that modern privacy law and judicial interference 
would lead to the death of media freedom.106 However, we need to be careful that broadcasting 
authorities are not castigated simply because they are carrying out their natural desire to 
entertain their audience, and to make ‘good television’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 See Thomas Bennett and Paul Wragg, ‘Was Richard v BBC correctly decided?’ (2018) 23(3) 
Communications Law 153, at 163. 
